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Regional Resistance to European Integration: 
The Case of the Scottish National Party, 1961-1972 
Andrew D. Devenney ∗ 
Abstract: »Regionaler Widerstand gegen die Europäische Integration: Der 
Fall der ‘Scottish National Party’, 1961-1972«. This article examines the evo-
lution of Scottish National Party (SNP) attitudes, policy, and rhetoric toward 
European integration between 1961 and 1972. Initially lukewarm, even posi-
tive, toward the proposed British membership in the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the party became increasingly hostile to EEC membership 
and adopted an aggressive anti-EEC position. By the early 1970s, the SNP was 
the leading anti-EEC political actor in Scotland, and it was the SNP’s efforts 
that helped turn an ignored British foreign policy issue into a Scottish domestic 
political issue that had wider implications for Scotland’s relationship with the 
United Kingdom and Europe, as well as for the ongoing Europeanization of 
Scottish politics and society. 
Keywords: Scotland, Scottish National Party, SNP, Scottish Politics, European 
Integration, Nationalism, European Economic Community, EEC. 
Introduction 
European integration, which has grown more prominent in the affairs of Europe 
since 1945, has long been a contentious issue for the political elites and the 
general public in the British Isles.1 Partly the result of simple geography and 
partly due to the existence of a complex mixture of intertwined Anglo-Celtic 
identities that largely denied the inherent “Europeaness” of the region, re-
sponses in the British Isles over the years to various permutations of the so-
called “European project” have ranged from reluctant acceptance to rabid resis-
tance and everything in-between. During the early years of the process – when 
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the Six (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands) came together to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
in 1951 and then signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, creating the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EUROATOM) – debate mostly took place at the national elite level among 
government bureaucrats, foreign ministry officials, and a select few national 
parliamentarians in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Republic of Ireland. 
There were two reasons for this. First, elites in the UK and Ireland generally 
considered the question of whether to join Europe a foreign policy matter of 
interest only to them. Second, the general public, following the elite lead, ex-
hibited little interest in the issue. That the UK and Ireland were not heavily 
involved in the negotiations over the Schuman Plan, the European Defense 
Community (EDC) in 1954, or the Treaty of Rome certainly contributed to this 
general disinterest. The general consensus was that it simply did not appear 
relevant to most peoples’ lives in the British Isles.  
However, in the 1960s/early 1970s, both elite attitudes and public interest 
began to change throughout the UK and Ireland. As various British and Irish 
governments considered and advanced applications to join the EEC (first in 
1961, then again in 1967 and 1970), public interest and attention increased. 
With that growing engagement came public questioning, which went beyond 
the intricate, technical debates over tariff regimes, power-sharing, and subsidies 
that dominated official discussions and negotiations. Instead, increasingly vocal 
factions in both nation-states called into question the whole scope and underly-
ing nature of the “European project” itself. Although they never used the term, 
these early opponents critiqued EEC membership because of what they per-
ceived as the impact Europeanization would have on British and Irish society 
and culture in the future.2 Often, they developed their critiques out of socio-
economic points of view (e.g. Marxism) or culturally nationalist perspectives 
(and frequently a mixture of both), while still framing the wider issue in a 
national context. And most scholars view their efforts as reactive; that is to say, 
anti-EEC opponents did not drive the debates in the 1960s/early 1970s so much 
as respond to them.3 Despite their vocal activism and more often because of 
their lack of monetary resources, these early skeptics of European integration 
failed to turn the public to their point of view, and both the UK and Ireland 
joined the EEC in 1973. 
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Agendas (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 46-58. 
3  For instance, regarding the Irish debate, see Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1989 
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Nevertheless, despite its clarity and directness, there are some important 
omissions from what one might label the standard narrative account of Euro-
pean integration in the British Isles prior to British and Irish membership in 
1973. First, while it is correct to note that national elites experienced and drove 
the EEC debates in both the UK and Ireland, this does not mean that regional 
(i.e. sub-national) political actors failed to participate or interject their own 
concerns. In fact, a closer look at the historical record demonstrates that be-
tween 1961 and 1972, the EEC issue increased in importance for regional el-
ites, and how they debated the question took on several region specific frames. 
This is not particularly surprising. After all, the UK is not a unitary state, but is 
made up of several distinct regions (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland), each with their own varied political dynamics and cultures. And Ire-
land, as well, has internal regional differences, particularly between Dublin and 
the more Gaelic areas to the west and south. This factor has important implica-
tions for how national elite political issues are received outside the confines of 
Westminster and Leister House. Second, the standard narrative account also 
diminishes the manner in which regional elites exerted influence over the con-
tours of the EEC debate at both the regional and national levels. In fact, in 
looking at critics of European integration in Scotland and Wales, it becomes 
apparent that they had a far greater impact on how British national elites at-
tempted to overcome their resistance. That is to say, regional resistance forced 
national elites to react and address regional concerns in the battle for public 
opinion, not the other way around. 
Therefore, this article will investigate this dynamic more clearly through a 
case study examination of the most prominent anti-EEC political actor in Scot-
land in the 1960s/early 1970s: the Scottish National Party (SNP). It will ex-
plore the evolution of the SNP’s attitudes, policies, and rhetoric towards the 
UK’s potential membership in the EEC prior to 1973, arguing that it was the 
SNP’s increasingly negative campaigning that helped turn what was initially an 
unimportant British foreign policy issue in Scotland into a domestic political 
question that had wider implications for Scottish and British politics. In conclu-
sion, it will also discuss the ramifications for Scotland of the SNP’s negative 
campaigning against European integration, looking specifically at the short-
term electoral impact for the SNP and in the longer term the Scottish public’s 
internalization of these negative attitudes toward European integration and 
Europe in general.  
Scotland and European Integration in the early 1960s 
To begin, what specifically was the response in the early 1960s in Scotland 
among political elites and the general public toward the issue of British mem-
bership in the EEC? Generally speaking, one can characterize the mood as a 
mixture of elite disinterest, public indifference, and isolated pockets of support 
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and advocacy. This resulted in public debate in Scotland on the EEC issue that 
rarely included Scottish perspectives or articulated Scottish interests (as distinct 
from British national interests). In terms of elite disinterest, one can see this 
manifested most clearly in the way Scottish Members of Parliament (MPs) 
approached the EEC issue. For much of the early 1960s, most Scottish MPs 
were rather uninterested in the EEC issue and made little to no effort to partici-
pate in the wider debate over British membership. This reflected a rather paro-
chial outlook prevalent among many of them that foreign policy questions had 
little importance for Scotland. Among Labour members in particular the inter-
est in foreign affairs debates was minimal, with only some left-wing MPs like 
Emrys Hughes and Jon Rankin and more establishment MPs like Arthur 
Woodburn participating in a more than cursory manner.4 Because the Conser-
vatives were in power during this period, more Scottish Conservative MPs, 
such as Lady Tweedsmuir Priscilla Buchan and Walter Scott the Earl of 
Dalkeith, exhibited greater interest in British and foreign affairs issues, though 
this was not necessarily replicated throughout the party.  
One useful, but not wholly reliable metric for developing a sense of this apa-
thy or lack thereof as it related to the EEC issue was the amount of cross-voting 
or abstentions on the two main Government EEC motions during the 1959-
1964 Parliament. The first motion, which the House debated in August 1961, 
had only a few Scottish members vote against the party stance. MPs William 
Baxter and Emrys Hughes, both Independent Labour members and rather left-
wing, opposed the Government motion, while only one Conservative, Sir 
James Duncan, failed to vote on the main motion (it is unclear what this meant 
since Duncan was present and voted against the Opposition amendment mo-
ments earlier).5 The second division in November 1962 had no cross-voting or 
abstentions of note. Thus few Scottish MPs felt strongly enough about the issue 
to go against the party position in the Commons, and those that did, primarily 
on the Labour side, approached their dissention from an ideological and not a 
regional perspective.  
Scottish MPs who did actively participate in Commons debates and ques-
tions on the EEC primarily argued from within the British national context. 
This is understandable, considering that the pull of British identity and nation-
alism would be strongest at the very heart of the British political system. For 
MPs like Labour members Arthur Woodburn, Jon Rankin, Emrys Hughes, and 
the Conservative MP Michael Clark Hutchison, foreign policy questions such 
as the EEC were national issues debated in a national forum where regional 
                                                             
4  James G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System, 3rd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
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interests played little to no part. For example, Jo Grimond, the Liberal Party 
leader at the time, often spoke in the Commons about the EEC, either to ques-
tion ministers or participate in debates, but he rarely integrated Scotland spe-
cifically into his discussions, even going so far as to brush off Scottish-themed 
interventions from other Scottish members.6 This is not to suggest that Jo Gri-
mond did not consider the plight of Scotland important. Instead, it suggests that 
while in the Commons the British context appeared more prominent in his 
statements, particularly when it came to foreign policy issues like the EEC. In 
reading through Grimond’s memoirs, one can see this dynamic played out even 
further on a wider scale. Here Grimond judiciously covers the experiences of 
Scotland during his lifetime, and specifically his Orkney and Shetland constitu-
ency. This reflects the sentiments of a man with deep respect and affection for 
his home and culture. And yet, when one turns to his treatment of the EEC 
issue, an issue that he and his Liberal colleagues were strongly supportive of 
from the beginning, it is striking how brief and exclusively British focused his 
treatment is.7 Grimond was by no means alone in this. Many Scottish MPs of 
all parties displayed British-specific tendencies in how they approached issues 
at Westminster. 
MPs in Westminster were not the only Scottish elites affected by conflict 
between their British and Scottish roles in the EEC debate; the political parties 
in Scotland also displayed this tension in their activities and rhetoric. On the 
surface, the party organizations in Scotland had rather clear-cut positions on the 
EEC issue – with the Scottish Conservatives and Liberals supporting and La-
bour wavering then rejecting support – but this did not mean that there were not 
also bodies of opinion within them that held an opposing view. However, the 
conflicting pull of British versus Scottish interests kept any one party from 
aggregating towards an overt nationalist EEC position. British political culture 
of the time subordinated regional interests to the national debate, especially 
regarding what was widely considered a national foreign policy issue. This was 
partly the result of Scottish party organization. The three national political 
parties had differing relationships with their Scottish party committees. On the 
one hand, the main Labour organ in Scotland, the Scottish Council of the La-
bour Party (SCLP), was not an independent party structure but rather an affili-
ated council that focused its activities primarily on Scottish affairs. Although it 
had its own annual conference, the SCLP was financially dependent on the 
Labour National Executive Committee (NEC) and therefore subject to its pres-
                                                             
6  During one debate in June 1962 over the Government’s policy, Grimond brushed off ques-
tions about the dangers to the Scottish wood pulp industry in the Common Market from 
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tary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series, no. 661 (1962), 560. 
7  For his limited treatment of the EEC issue, see Jo Grimond, Memoirs (London: Heinemann, 
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sures and dictates.8 On the other hand, the Scottish Liberal Party had tradition-
ally maintained its independence and status as a separate party since 1946, 
asserting its rights to run its own affairs, formulate its own policies, and organ-
ize its own conferences. Despite the levels of relative or actual autonomy, 
Scottish party committees found it difficult to reconcile a one-size-fits-all mes-
sage from the national party with local Scottish concerns. Factions in both the 
Scottish Labour and Conservative parties at times expressed private frustration 
at their national executives’ inattention to regional concerns. Sometimes, this 
boiled over into public criticism, such as when the West Renfrewshire Con-
stituency Labour Party called for “more self-determination within the Scottish 
Council of the Labour Party” and demanded that the SCLP “should bring pres-
sure to bear on the National Executive [of] the need to regard Scotland as a 
country, rather than as a region.”9 However, very little of this regional frustra-
tion interjected itself into the national EEC debate; by and large Scottish issues 
were unimportant to the wider question. 
As the 1960s moved on, Scottish political elites began exhibiting a greater 
willingness to interject Scottish issues into the national EEC debate. This mani-
fested itself in a variety of ways among both Scottish MPs at Westminster and 
the party committees in Scotland. For instance, during the May 1967 Commons 
debate over the Wilson Government’s second application to join the EEC, 
Scottish questions caused a bit of stir on the second day of a three-day debate 
when several Scottish Labour MPs complained that the chair was systemati-
cally ignoring Scottish speakers in the debate.10 On the following day, two 
Scottish MPs, the Conservative Michael Clark Hutchison and from Labour Jon 
Rankin, “caught the Speaker’s eye” and gave speeches. In them, they both 
focused on various concerns for Scottish industry and the danger that regional 
inequities of economic investment between England and Scotland would be 
intensified by EEC membership.11 In and of themselves, these limited interjects 
were hardly notable, but looking at the wider political context in Scotland, this 
slow shift in emphasis towards Scottish concerns in the EEC debate does not 
appear to have been arrived at on its own. Instead, Scottish political elites be-
gan shifting their approach to the EEC (or in some cases talking about it at all) 
because they were reacting to a changing political climate in Scotland. Issues 
of sovereignty and nationalism, supremely important yet minimally discussed 
up to that point in the context of the EEC debate, began to figure more promi-
nently in Scottish political discourse. And it was the electoral emergence of the 
                                                             
8  For more information, see Frances Wood, “Scottish Labour in Government and Opposition, 
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SNP that heralded in this shift, one that profoundly changed politics in Scot-
land, and, more specifically, the contours of the EEC debate. 
The Scottish National Party and  
European Integration in the early 1960s 
The 1960s was a significant decade of change for the nationalist movement in 
Scotland. It was a time whereby the SNP transformed itself from, in the words 
of Christopher Harvie, “a resilient little sect” into an organized political party 
built to contest and win parliamentary elections.12 Founded in 1934 by the 
merger of the National Party of Scotland, which advocated for full independ-
ence, and the Scottish Party, which argued for Home Rule, the SNP spent the 
next twenty-five years riven by internal disagreements, factional in-fighting, 
and negligible electoral impact, aside from isolated successes like victory in the 
1945 Motherwall and Wishaw by-election.13 The party’s minor status in Scot-
tish politics during this prolonged period in the wilderness helped fuel break-
away factions like the Scottish Convention (later the Scottish Covenant Asso-
ciation) in 1942 and also led to divisive expulsions of party members like the 
radical “55 Group” in 1955.14 By the mid-1950s, the party’s strength was at 
such low ebb that it only contested two Scottish seats during the 1955 General 
Election and five seats during the 1959 contest. The SNP’s then leader Arthur 
Donaldson later quipped that if “all the activists of the SNP could have been 
the complement of a small passenger aircraft, and had they flown together and 
crashed without survivors, the cause of independence would have been lost to 
view for many years.”15 
By 1960, the party’s fortunes began to look up, due primarily to several ex-
ternal and internal factors. For instance, the collapse of the rival Scottish Cove-
nant Association upon the death in 1961 of the longtime Scottish nationalist 
leader John MacCormick left the SNP solely in control of the nationalist 
movement for the first time in twenty years.16 Additionally, the unstable Scot-
tish economy of the late 1950s and early 1960s created “a sympathetic envi-
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ronment for the SNP.”17 This was aggravated by the fact that the Conservative 
Macmillan Government’s muted response to Scotland’s economic difficulties 
increased public sympathies for more direct Scottish control over its own af-
fairs. Internally, a new collection of activists, led by the farmer and former 
RAF pilot Ian Macdonald and the businessman and scout leader William 
Wolfe, joined the party from 1958-1961 that brought new levels of profession-
alism, organization, finance, and policy analysis to the party structure. After his 
third-place showing, gaining eighteen percent of the vote in the Glasgow 
Bridgeton by-election in November 1961, Macdonald sold his farm and joined 
the party as a full-time national organizer, the party’s first since the early 
1950s.18 Macdonald’s efforts were systematic and thorough, and involved 
regular travel across Scotland to establish party branches; before 1962 the SNP 
had less than twenty branches, but by 1965 there were 140.19 The party also 
stabilized its finances through the use of Alba Pools, a fundraising football pool 
that was rather popular both inside and out of the party.20 With the party’s 
second place showing behind Wolfe as their candidate in the West Lothian by-
election in June 1962, outpolling the Conservatives by nearly five thousand 
votes, the SNP took tangible steps towards major party status in Scotland. 
As it matured as a party, the SNP refined and adapted its attitudes and policy 
positions toward the EEC issue during the 1960s. This process led to the party 
moving away from a generally positive outlook toward European integration 
towards complete opposition by the late 1960s. As such, the public soon identi-
fied the SNP as the main anti-EEC opposition in Scotland. This turnaround in 
the party’s position did not happen purely for internal reasons. After the Six 
formed the EEC in 1957, the perception grew throughout the UK that the EEC 
was an elitist, centralizing organization with undemocratic tendencies; for 
many in the SNP, these descriptions mirrored their arguments for Scottish 
independence, a connection the SNP leadership sought to exploit.21 The fact 
that the UK had sought EEC membership without any apparent interest in 
accommodating or dealing with Scottish concerns in the negotiations contrib-
uted to the SNP’s attitude shift.22 There was also a burgeoning belief that Scot-
tish entry on terms negotiated primarily for British interests would further 
damage the already weakened Scottish economy. This viewpoint was prevalent 
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throughout both the party and the Scottish public and influenced the SNP’s 
changing positions on the EEC.23 
Nevertheless, EEC policy was not an important part of the party’s campaign 
rhetoric in the early 1960s. This reflected both the relative strength of the na-
tionalist cause at the time and the general Scottish disinterest in the EEC issue. 
When the party did comment on the EEC issue, it criticized Scotland’s lack of 
direct representation in the negotiating process, not the notion of Scottish 
membership itself. At the 1962 Annual conference in Perth, the SNP passed a 
resolution that criticized the Government’s EEC policy on typical nationalist 
grounds, stating that it was not competent to take Scotland into the EEC with-
out Scottish representation.24 The resolution also demanded “proper Scottish 
representation on all matters involving Scotland in the Common Market.”25 The 
party was not at this point anti-EEC per se, but rather targeted the critical issue 
(as far as they were concerned) of Scottish representation in the process. It was, 
in essence, an effort to connect or link Scottish independence with membership 
in the EEC, and served more as a rhetorical cudgel against the British. EEC 
membership or lack thereof was not necessarily the point. One can see this 
positive but muted attitude toward EEC membership in a party pamphlet pub-
lished in 1963 that touched on the issue of fair trade for Scotland: “Free Trade 
is a mirage but freer and fairer trade will be favoured. This is fully possible 
only between countries having comparable standards of living. The European 
Common Market is a most attractive example but it would be most unwise to 
go in without our own Government to negotiate terms of entry and protect our 
interests after entry.”26 
The failure of the first British application contributed to this lack of vigor in 
the party’s EEC policy. It was difficult for the SNP, and all other political 
parties, to expend time, energy, and money on an issue that was not moving 
forward because there was no firm date for British membership.27 Little policy 
innovation took place from 1963-1965, with a resolution during the 1965 an-
nual conference merely restating in slightly more trenchant terms the resolution 
of 1962.28 By 1966, the SNP was still framing its arguments around a positive 
appreciation of eventual Scottish membership as an independent state. At the 
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1966 annual conference, the party established a number of conditions for the 
UK in any future EEC negotiations, which included recognizing Scotland as a 
separate country and making Scotland’s entry into the EEC conditional upon 
having a “separate voting status.”29 A four month recruitment drive organized 
by the National Secretary Gordon Wilson during late 1966 argued for the bene-
fits to the British Isles if England, Scotland, and Wales all had individual 
memberships and voting rights in the EEC.30 
1967: Turning Points 
The year 1967 was a watershed for the SNP, as it finally made an impact on the 
Scottish and British political scenes. Building off its previous party reorganiza-
tion, the SNP grew stronger at the ballot box. This growth took place in an 
advantageous political environment. The Labour Government’s ineptitude and 
bad luck meant its promises to recast the economy by welding technological 
progress to national planning in the “white heat of the technological revolu-
tion” largely failed.31 In March, the SNP polled twenty-eight percent in the 
Glasgow Pollock by-election, giving the Labour seat to the Conservatives 
behind the historian and television personality Esmond Wright; in May, the 
party’s local elections performance rose from 4.4 percent to a little over eight-
een percent.32 But the biggest shock came later. In November, the party’s 
young, articulate, and charismatic candidate for the Hamilton by-election, 
Winifred “Winnie” Ewing, overturned a 16,000 Labour majority in one of 
Labour’s safest seats to become the party’s first MP since 1945. According to 
Tom Devine, “The victory truly put the SNP on the British political map and 
attracted huge press and television interest. The success also sent shockwaves 
through the other political parties.”33 Accompanied by enthusiastic nationalist 
supporters, Ewing was driven to Westminster in a scarlet Hillman Imp from the 
Scottish Linwood assembly plant.34 The SNP was now a credible force in Scot-
tish politics. The momentum continued into 1968, where the party had its local 
election vote climb to thirty percent.35 
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The year of Ewing’s stunning victory at Hamilton also marked the begin-
nings of a shift in the SNP’s attitudes and policy positions toward Europe. In 
part, it was the Labour Government’s turnaround toward support for British 
membership in the EEC, and the months of hinting and pre-negotiations which 
preceded it, that stimulated the SNP’s increased activity. The immediacy of the 
issue led to further activity on the part of the SNP. In January 1967, the Eco-
nomics and Information sub-committee of the NEC had discussions regarding 
the party’s attitude toward Europe and how best to educate party members on 
the issue.36 As part of this effort, the committee considered drafting a memo-
randum on “Scotland’s case in relation to the EEC,” an effort subsequently 
supported by the full NEC.37 The memo’s purpose was to make a succinct and 
forceful case that an independent Scotland was imminent and that such an 
independent Scotland wanted friendly but non-committal relations with various 
European supranational organizations, such as the EEC, the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), and the Council of Europe.38 In keeping with this, 
the memo served notice that an independent Scotland would not automatically 
honor treaty arrangements made by the British Government. This was not sim-
ply a statement for domestic Scottish consumption or for the Government in 
London. The intent, as William Wolfe later argued, was to demonstrate to the 
leaders of nearly twenty-seven European states the depths of nationalist feeling 
in Scotland.39 It was also an effort to showcase Scotland’s resistance to the UK 
“dragging” her into Europe against her will, a line of argument in keeping with 
previous policy. The statement that Scotland would not honor British treaty 
obligations had also been a previous policy position adopted at conference in 
1963, only no one had paid much attention at the time.40 From March to April, 
the NEC sub-committee crafted the memo (eventually entitled “Scotland and 
Europe”), had it translated into French, and prepared for its distribution, a rapid 
effort for which the full NEC congratulated the sub-committee.41 
Released in June, the memo’s impact was rather negligible. In his autobio-
graphical account of the SNP’s rise, William Wolfe used rather restrained 
language in describing the memo’s importance. He wrote, “We are not likely to 
know the effect of that Memorandum until there are Scottish Embassies in 
Europe, but I believe that our action … at least let the English Government 
know, from unexpected quarters, that the Scottish National Party existed and 
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was active.”42 One modern commentator has even described it as a “gloriously 
pompous note” that contained echoes of a British film farce starring Peter Sell-
ers, The Mouse That Roared (1959), which dealt with a poor, backward nation 
declaring war on the United States hoping to lose and gain foreign aid.43 
SNP thinking on Europe altered further after Harold Wilson’s announce-
ment in early May regarding a renewed application for EEC membership. In a 
memo to the NEC entitled “Foreign Affairs: EEC,” Gordon Wilson offered 
some pointed analysis regarding the party’s assumptions about Europe. In all 
its subtle forms, the SNP’s policy toward the EEC always returned to the issue 
of sovereignty, specifically the need for an independent Scottish Government. 
Gordon Wilson’s memo, however, sharpened this goal further by connecting 
Scottish independence with an anti-EEC position. In it, Wilson acknowledged 
the limited tenor and mild character of the SNP’s previous policy, noting that, 
“In the recent past the S.N.P. has not expressed any strong views on whether it 
would be advisable for Scotland to enter the Common Market as an independ-
ent state.”44 
Gordon Wilson argued that this strategy of criticizing the process but not the 
overall aims was wrong. Instead, the SNP should oppose the EEC itself, and 
not simply the process of accession. Wilson cited the economic effects of EEC 
membership on the Scottish economy, particularly the light and heavy engi-
neering sectors, as one of the determining factors for this new attitude. How-
ever, he also very unequivocally stated his primary concern before that, namely 
the threat to Scottish identity. Wilson wrote, “I am convinced that if Scotland 
does go into the EEC on UK terms it will spell the beginning of the destruction 
of our national identity.”45 Wilson then argued for a hardnosed, aggressive 
campaign against the EEC that emphasized the EEC’s impact upon Scottish 
independence. The “cardinal points” as Wilson described them were extensive 
and included arguments that entry was illegal under the terms of the 1707 Act 
of Union; that entry would lead to further loss of Scottish control to London 
and Brussels, higher food prices, and a flood of cheap immigrant labor; and 
that entry would destroy Scotland’s national identity. What is interesting about 
his “cardinal points” is what he did not include, namely any kind of cultural 
nationalist goal, such as Gaelic language revival. This reflected the economic 
nationalism that underpinned the SNP’s rise. Ultimately, Wilson believed this 
campaign “would be reasonably attractive in Scotland and practicable in Euro-
pean terms,” but that the party had to deliver it with a “hard intransigent” atti-
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tude.46 As he stated, “What we say and do is being studied and analysed, par-
ticularly after recent favourable election results. Any sign of weakness or hesi-
tation will be noted. Our vigour and our intransigence will be embarrassing to 
the UK Government and will strengthen Scotland’s position.”47 Wilson’s spe-
cific campaign suggestions included an emergency declaration for the annual 
conference and a timeline outlining a series of propaganda steps throughout the 
summer and fall of 1967, including press releases, leaflet distribution, branch 
resolutions, a television broadcast showcasing the effects of the EEC on Scot-
land, and delegations to various European capitals. 
The NEC ultimately never fully carried out Wilson’s proposed campaign 
against the EEC; instead, they proposed a less aggressive campaign. One of 
Wilson’s suggestions had been for a resolution during the annual conference in 
June to mark his proposed shift in position. The NEC subsequently submitted 
it, and the conference duly accepted it as party policy. The resolution reiterated 
the party demands that Scotland needed an independent Scottish Government 
to safeguard Scottish interests during any EEC negotiations; explicitly refer-
enced the 1707 Act of Union, arguing that the UK could make “no material 
change” to the terms without Scottish consent, which presumably the Treaty of 
Rome would do; and also again threatened to “repudiate any [international] 
Agreement under which Scotland has no separate national representation.”48 
However, what was interesting about the resolution was that it was not the one 
Wilson had suggested. Wilson’s version included a more forceful negative 
analysis of the EEC, stating “[this conference] declares further that entry into 
the European Economic Community at the present time may prove disastrous 
to our heavy and light engineering industries, to out agricultural industry and to 
our successful exporting pattern.”49 It also included language intensifying the 
party’s threat to abrogate treaties by specifically linking this threat to the Treaty 
of Rome.50 The NEC removed both of these statements, demonstrating that 
there was still resistance to a full-fledged anti-EEC party line. Partly this was a 
hesitancy borne out of a lack of information. Party funds during the 1960s, 
while somewhat stabilized by Alba Pools and branch subscriptions, were al-
ways in short supply, and it was only in August 1968 that the party employed a 
full-time Research Officer.51 Party volunteers and the overburdened NEC had 
traditionally carried out this function, often with great difficulty in lack of 
manpower and resources. As the party achieved more success in 1967 and the 
Scottish establishment paid more attention to them, the SNP needed a more 
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rigorous vetting of party policy. This was especially necessary in light of a 
Scottish opinion survey the party commissioned that showed many Scottish 
people had negative opinions of the SNP leadership, viewing them as “unbal-
anced types” who were vague on policy matters.52 Therefore, the NEC, in con-
sidering Wilson’s memo, cautiously acknowledged that it needed more infor-
mation before any campaign could take place and invited the executive vice-
chairmen, under the direction of William Wolfe, to meet and consider Wilson’s 
suggestions further.53 In August, Wolfe’s sub-committee reported back to the 
NEC on the proposed anti-EEC campaign for the autumn. The NEC accepted 
the report, which described a campaign in which “the constitutional position of 
Scotland would be kept in view” and “would be positive and not negative.”54 
Hardening the Line, 1968-1970 
Despite this muted resistance, Gordon Wilson’s anti-EEC position eventually 
became party orthodoxy between 1968 and 1970. Wolfe’s campaign in the fall 
of 1967 included an increased proliferation of anti-EEC rhetoric, despite the 
NEC’s desire otherwise. Partly this came from an implied understanding of the 
SNP position. The party’s emergency conference resolution passed in June was 
not positive toward membership in the EEC, even with the NEC removing the 
more hostile language. It appeared to some critics that, by spending so much 
time erecting barriers and declaring warnings about Scotland’s international 
relations, the SNP was merely covering up a greater philosophical hostility to 
the European project in general. 
The Hamilton by-election campaign also helped increase this perception. 
From the first announcement of her candidacy, Winnie Ewing’s campaign 
emphasized the EEC issue repeatedly, focusing on the need to keep Scotland 
out without consultation.55 In her Wallace Day speech at the site of William 
Wallace’s execution in London in 1305, Ewing drew an explicit connection 
between Wallace’s struggle for freedom and Scotland’s present-day fight to 
keep the UK from dragging it into the EEC, the implication being that Scotland 
would not join even if given the choice.56 After Hamilton, according to William 
Wolfe, the SNP received more press coverage and analysis than ever before.57 
Its position on the EEC was no exception to this increased attention. One repre-
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sentative example appeared in December 1967 in a regional newspaper, the 
Falkirk Herald, where an anti-SNP editorial criticized the party’s position in 
somewhat rich and excited language. After claiming that the main case against 
the SNP was economic and comparing the highly developed industrial econ-
omy of Scotland with the more agrarian one of Ireland, it then noted that the 
implications of the SNP’s anti-EEC position would be “customs barriers at 
Gretna and Berwick. Would the next step be compulsory Gaelic in Scottish 
schools?”58 The editorial then argued that the “present narrow nationalism” 
typified by the SNP was part of a “pattern of frustration caused by the declining 
importance of James Watt’s invention and the fact that we can no longer go out 
and govern India. Even the barren rocks of Aden are now outside our com-
mand.”59 The more prominent newspapers in Scotland also discussed the 
party’s EEC position in terms similar to this, depending upon the political 
leanings of the editorialists in question. This was the impression the SNP’s 
position was giving and made it very difficult for the party to change course, 
even if it so desired (which it did not). 
What further cemented the party’s anti-EEC position was the opportunity to 
campaign in new battlegrounds. With Winnie Ewing a MP in Westminster, the 
SNP had a new stage upon which to challenge the British Government and 
bring attention to its goal of Scottish independence. In the face of hostility and 
ill-treatment from all sides of the political spectrum, Ewing was prolific in 
submitting written and oral questions to ministers and participating in Com-
mons debates.60 One area she particularly focused on was the EEC. She repeat-
edly questioned Labour Government ministers, including the Prime Minister 
himself and the Secretary of State for Scotland Willie Ross, about whether the 
Government intended to produce a White Paper examining the impact of EEC 
membership on Scotland (the answer was always no) or whether there were any 
Scottish representatives involved in EEC negotiations (the answer was also 
always no).61 Ewing was not alone in this effort to pin down the Government 
over a White Paper; MPs on both sides of the issue from across the party spec-
trum also felt strongly about this, but Ewing was particularly unrelenting.62 
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Between January 1968 and April 1970, Ewing sought written or oral answers 
related to Scotland and the EEC on nearly ten occasions, which appears more 
impressive when one considers that some Scottish Labour MPs found it almost 
impossible to question any ministers on any issue at all. 
Ewing’s parliamentary contributions also included participation in a Com-
mons debate regarding EEC membership. In February 1970, the Labour Gov-
ernment had issued a further White Paper on the UK’s membership in the EEC 
(Command Paper No. 4289). In the subsequent debate, Winnie Ewing was 
prolific, interrupting several speakers to make interventions regarding Scotland 
and the EEC and giving a speech on the first day. In it, she explained the SNP 
position on membership, often in the face of laughter, interruptions, and some 
rather raucous behavior. The speech itself was anti-EEC in tone and rhetoric, 
labeling the EEC as an “undemocratic community … controlled by bureau-
crats.”63 At one point, she focused on the argument common at the time that the 
EEC did not fully represent Europe due to its Cold War divisions. She then 
claimed that her opposition to the UK joining was an extension of her interna-
tionalism. As she said, “Our going into the Community will be divisive.… I am 
an internationalist, which means that I believe in a relationship between na-
tions. I speak for one nation, and I do not find it amusing that I am the only one 
in this House to do so”.64 After further questioning what the economic benefits 
were for Scotland and further arguing that the supposed benefits of member-
ship for England were actually negatives for Scotland, Ewing finished her 
speech by stating, “The world recognises [sic] that the Scots are very good 
internationalists. We do not think that entry to the Common market by the 
United Kingdom will advance that cause in any respect whatsoever.”65 
SNP campaigning activities beyond Scotland included high level contacts 
with the EEC itself. In March 1970, the SNP leadership sent a delegation to 
Brussels and Amsterdam that included Senior Vice-Chairman George Leslie, 
Winnie Ewing, James Halliday, and Director of Communications Douglas 
Crawford.66 The main purpose of the trip besides publicity was to inform the 
EEC about resistance to the British application in Scotland and about various 
Scottish specific interests or problems were the UK to join.67 As George Leslie 
described it, the delegation focused on several points in its discussions with the 
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EEC, namely that “public opinion in Scotland was against entry and capable of 
being organised by us, that economic conditions in Scotland were entirely 
different from the rest of the United Kingdom and that the British government 
had no constitutional or legal right to speak for Scotland.”68 In addition to 
representative meetings, the delegation also conducted press conferences and 
television interviews with the continental European press and meet up with 
SNP supporters living in the Netherlands and Belgium.69 By and large, the 
party leadership considered the trip a success on all fronts, despite its close 
resemblance to the party’s less successful memorandum in 1967. In his report 
to the NEC analyzing the trip, William Wolfe wrote, “Obviously a very impor-
tant step has been taken towards establishing in Europe in general, and in the 
EEC in particular, some recognition of the existence, aims and strength of the 
Scottish National Party.”70 The SNP Vice-Chair for Publicity, Michael Grieve 
also emphasized that the trip “apart from making an impact on EEC officials 
largely unaware of Scotland and the SNP, also achieved useful publicity in 
Britain.”71 It was perhaps these contacts more than anything else that altered 
thinking within the party, as for good or for ill they witnessed up close various 
EEC officials’ levels of interest in national issues. 
In terms of SNP attitudes toward Europe, their experiences were mainly 
negative. This was the impression the delegation gained from its trip. The dele-
gation described the EEC representatives’ attitudes and demeanor by stating 
that “the EEC representatives … ‘showed an almost religious determination to 
end national awareness” and that they were “rather vague regarding the free-
dom of member countries to make their own financial and industrial poli-
cies.”72 Impressions like this influenced opinion within the party for a more 
hard line. According to William Wolfe, “The discussions with the Scottish 
National Party following the return of our delegation to Brussels clarified our 
view of the Common Market and consequently hardened our opposition to it. 
Ours was essentially a political view.”73  
Ewing’s Commons speech in February 1970 and the party’s presentation to 
the EEC Commission in March served as signs that the SNP’s attitudes toward 
EEC membership had hardened. This movement is also reflected in internal 
party discussions and in the public statements made throughout 1969-1970. For 
instance, in early 1969, the NEC External Affairs Committee, under the direc-
tion of James Halliday, produced a foreign affairs policy review accepted by 
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the NEC in late March. In it, the leadership described the attitudes and policy 
positions of a “free” Scotland in the conduct of its foreign policy. The docu-
ment’s suggestions included remaining in the British Commonwealth; seeking 
membership in the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Nordic 
Council; and undertaking the obligations of NATO membership while reserv-
ing the right to negotiate with the United States and the UK regarding foreign 
bases in Scotland.74 The policy document also intimated that an independent 
Scotland would seek membership not in the EEC but rather in the EFTA, and 
then stated, “Future trading developments in Europe will be kept under con-
stant review, and Scotland’s attitude to the European Economic Community 
will be assessed in the light of circumstances prevailing upon the attainment of 
independence.”75 An undated party electoral handbill, most likely from early 
1970, also displayed this shift by using rather excited political rhetoric. It 
stated: “These men (and their parties) are DANGEROUS! Heath, Wilson, 
Grimond. Heath and Wilson (and Grimond too) are hell bent on dragging us 
into the Common Market with neither choice nor voice . . . We would have NO 
VOICE at Brussels. THE COMMON MARKET IS NOT AN ELECTION 
ISSUE FOR THEM, BUT IT IS FOR YOU.”76 
In addition, aggressive statements by party leaders also cemented this 
change in party policy. At a speech in Paisley on 31 March 1970, the by then 
Party Chairman William Wolfe characterized the EEC and the political central-
ism its institutions represented as a form of “conglomerate fascism” that would 
transform Scotland into a dystopia on par with George Orwell’s 1984.77 Wolfe 
argued that the EEC was not merely an economic trading bloc, but rather a 
major threat to Scottish national identity. Using the analogy of an iceberg in 
still waters, Wolfe stated: 
The distinct shape of the political centralism which is now clearly over the 
horizon is an ice-berg, and we have seen only the tip of its dangerous and de-
structive might. It threatens to crash into Western Europe and destroy all the 
ideals of national freedom and national identity which Western Europe has 
developed, often painfully, over the last 700 years. The ideals, the principles of 
participating democracy and modern nationhood, were born in Scotland. We 
must defend them.78 
He went on to describe pro-EEC supporters as apparatchiks who were “as 
doctrinaire centralist as their opposite numbers in the Kremlin in Moscow” and 
who had twisted “the noble vision of the founding fathers of the Common 
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Market … into a most frightening nightmare …”79 It was this “frightening 
nightmare” of political centralism in the UK that had been “desperately damag-
ing to Scotland’s people and to her economy. The centralism of the Common 
Market would be a cancer which would eat the very heart out of Scotland with 
no hope or cure.”80 Vitriolic rhetoric and dire warnings of disaster had replaced 
the more cautious and tempered positions of the mid-1960s. 
While the question of how specifically the SNP evolved towards a hardened 
anti-EEC attitude is interesting in and of itself, what matters here is that the 
SNP was the first political force in Scotland to articulate clearly Scottish inter-
ests in the EEC debate. This had important implications for how the EEC de-
bate unfolded into the 1970s. Since other Scottish political elites proved unable 
or unwilling to engage the EEC issue in a Scottish context in the early 1960s, 
this provided the SNP with an excellent opportunity to further influence public 
opinion towards independence. By being first, they defined what those Scottish 
interests were on their rhetorical and political terms and in the process in-
creased public awareness of the EEC as a domestic concern. In doing so, they 
also inadvertently created a linkage between being a nationalist and being 
against the EEC. At first this was beneficial. Political unionism was declining 
in influence as an ideology in Scottish politics. And, although there were plenty 
of individual exceptions, support for EEC membership came predominantly 
from unionist politicians in both the Labour and Conservative Parties.81 Since 
unionism was what political nationalism was supplanting, it was sensible to 
adopt the opposite position on the EEC. Polling also demonstrated that public 
opinion in Scotland was moving against membership, with an astonishing 
seventy-three percent saying no in a 1971 poll.82 Thus, the SNP clearly bene-
fited from being an upstart populist political movement standing up for Scottish 
interests against an out-of-touch political establishment, and their EEC position 
was an important part of this. However, it later became a difficulty for the 
party. Being wedded to an absolute position on the EEC meant the party was 
unable to adapt when the Scottish political establishment responded to the 
nationalist challenge and sought to recast what Scottish interests were. 
The Battle joined, 1970-1975 
The nationalist challenge in Scotland forced the main British political parties to 
change course and adapt to a new political reality, one that placed greater em-
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phasis on issues of sovereignty, identity, and nationalism than previously. 
Because of internal divisions and ideological blockages among Labour and the 
Conservatives, their controversial and muddled attempts to wield the political 
cudgel of devolution to beat back Scottish nationalism (such as Conservative 
Party leader Edward Heath’s 1968 Declaration of Perth that committed the 
Conservatives to a policy of Scottish devolution or Labour Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson’s Royal Commission on the Constitution established in 1969) 
had the countervailing result that their emphasis on constitutional issues and 
the problem of sovereignty between England and Scotland actually increased 
public attention to these issues.83 This in turn had an impact on the public’s 
internalization of the EEC debate, specifically by increasing the public’s hostil-
ity to the idea. Although there were few specific instances where the two de-
bates – EEC membership and devolution – cross-referenced each other, there 
were points of overlap and connectedness stemming from the shifting contours 
of Scottish politics in the late 1960s/early 1970s. This was because both de-
bates similarly dealt with political and economic problems vital to future Scot-
tish prosperity. As such, they further brought into focus for political elites and 
the Scottish public questions regarding Scotland’s role and sovereignty in the 
UK and Europe.84 
Nevertheless, following Heath’s surprise victory in the 1970 General Elec-
tion, the new Conservative Government committed itself to pushing for British 
membership in the EEC. With the French President Charles de Gaulle no 
longer in power in France (he had been the brake on the two previous attempts 
by the UK to join in 1961-63 and 1967), the atmosphere within the EEC mem-
ber states was more amenable to British membership.85 Over the next two 
years, there was a protracted and contentious debate that revealed divisions 
within all the major parties over the issue and growing public apprehension. 
This forced the Heath Government to work hard to overcome public and par-
liamentary opposition, utilizing the support of British industry, pro-European 
pressure groups like the European Movement, the pro-European party commit-
tees like the Conservative Group for Europe, and most of the British media.86 
Regional issues featured more prominently in the overall debate. For instance, 
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during the important October 1971 Commons debate, the Government unoffi-
cially set aside one day of the six day debate for the consideration of Scottish 
and Welsh concerns about the EEC, which had not taken place in any of the 
previous EEC Commons debates. By and large, Heath was successful in lower-
ing public opposition and in gaining parliamentary support for membership, 
often in the teeth of furious resistance and obstruction. In a key vote on 28 
October 1971 approving the principle of membership, the Government 
achieved a majority of 112 with the support of sixty nine dissident Labour 
MPs. On 22 January 1972, the UK signed the Treaty of Accession with the 
EEC, and after a fierce parliamentary battle over the specific clauses of the 
European Communities Bill, the UK, along with Denmark and Ireland, offi-
cially joined the EEC on 1 January 1973.87 Heath was victorious. 
In Scotland, the main Scottish political parties suffered similar levels of di-
visiveness as the national parties. However, of all sides, it was the SNP that 
campaigned the most vigorously and consistently on EEC membership during 
the Heath Government. Their hard-lined opposition placed them as the party 
most committed to keeping Scotland out of the EEC. The SNP had been the 
only party to make EEC membership an important issue in their 1970 election 
campaign, and that emphasis carried over into their post-1970 activities. They 
campaigned vigorously against EEC membership, issuing leaflets, engaging the 
issue in the House of Commons, organizing local constituency referendums 
and petitions, and making it an important component of their 1971 by-election 
campaign in the Stirling and Falkirk constituency.88 They also continued their 
international outreach by sending party officials to Brussels, Paris, and Norway 
several times between 1970 and 1972 to press the party’s positions and connect 
with like-minded anti-EEC activists abroad.89 Such efforts were rather similar 
in scope and outlook to the March 1970 delegation; in fact, the delegation in 
January 1972 to the EEC Commission delivered a memorandum nearly identi-
cal in tone and substance to their 1967 effort, including a self-important state-
ment that the SNP was the only political body competent to speak for Scot-
land.90 In addition, the party unofficially coordinated with the national anti-
EEC campaigns through their lone MP Donald Stewart, who was an important 
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member of the former Liberal and free trader Christopher Frere-Smith’s Keep 
Britain Out (KBO) organization.91 
The SNP’s campaign activities against EEC membership ultimately failed. 
While the party felt it had “credibility” on the EEC issue, its efforts only suc-
ceeded in increasing the negative opinion the Scottish public had of the EEC, 
not in keeping the UK out of the Community.92 There is also little evidence that 
the EEC played more than a cursory role in the party’s second electoral break-
through in 1974. This was because issues like North Sea oil, the deeply un-
popular industrial policies of the Heath Government, and the dispute with the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) appeared more prominently in politi-
cal discourse at the time. In addition, the SNP’s hard-line opposition to mem-
bership in principle weakened the party’s campaign. By adopting such a fixed 
and absolute position, it kept the party from adapting to changing political 
circumstances, particularly as pro-European factions used their monetary ad-
vantages to shift public opinion. 
The party leadership quickly came to recognize this and attempted to recast 
the party’s position on the EEC. In November 1970, Malcolm Slesser, a mem-
ber of the party’s NEC, produced a report analyzing the party’s tactics and 
strategy towards the EEC. In it, he acknowledged that the SNP’s present atti-
tude was a problem that would “fail to impress, except by its consistent ob-
structionism” if the UK failed to make it into the EEC.93 He also noted that the 
party’s position would be weakened by the UK entering because of the percep-
tion that the SNP had no power to change anything: “For people to vote for use, 
we must be seen to be a force.”94 As such, Slesser advocated a series of tactical 
changes: one, highlight England’s economic weakness and Scotland’s eco-
nomic strength, emphasizing that England needed to join the EEC to survive; 
two; point out that the British parties knew this and were covering it up with 
“aggressive British nationalism;” three, argue that the EEC was not a true and 
proper internationalist organization; and four, stop opposing the EEC on prin-
ciple and show that Scotland has more options to stay in or out if independ-
ent.95 Slesser argued that such a strategy allowed the party to appear “to be the 
reasonable, the international, the balanced party” while also demonstrating that 
the other British parties were “simply out to save England, even at the expense 
of the dignity of the English people and economic survival of Scotland.”96 The 
NEC subsequently debated the paper and accepted its conclusions, charging 
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William Wolfe with implementing it.97 However, this repositioning was ulti-
mately problematic. It made the SNP’s message more ambiguous and less 
effective; instead of being completely against EEC membership, the SNP mes-
sage became bogged down in qualifiers and equivocations. While it may have 
been useful in smoothing over any disagreements between pro- and anti- fac-
tions within the party, it only served to make the party position more complex. 
This ambiguity would later cause the party more difficulty as the seemingly 
settled debate over British membership continued. 
Despite the UK successfully achieving membership in 1973, the political 
battles over the UK remaining in the EEC continued to dominate the political 
scene for the next two years. The Labour Party, which had earlier called for 
renegotiation of the terms of membership and also a public referendum on the 
question, came back into power in 1974 and set about fulfilling their manifesto 
promise. In doing so, the stage was set for a rough-and-tumble EEC Referen-
dum campaign to settle the question of British participation in the EEC, which 
took place in June 1975.98 Opposition in Scotland remained high during 1973-
1975, and the SNP thought to galvanize a coordinated campaign to have Scot-
land vote against remaining in Europe as a stepping stone to achieving Scottish 
independence. However, the SNP’s campaign was a muddled, ambiguous affair 
rife with internal contradictions, a problem that reflected some growing divi-
sions within the party over the EEC.99 Nonetheless, after a referendum cam-
paign dominated by the pro-European campaign’s financial advantage – a 
phenomenon Winnie Ewing castigated as buying “Scottish votes with English 
gold” – the UK voted to remain in the EEC by sixty-seven to thirty-two percent 
(in Scotland the margin was fifty-eight to forty-one percent).100 
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Conclusions 
As this article argues, the emergence of political Scottish nationalism in the 
1960s and its deliberate linkage with a hard-line anti-EEC position altered the 
shape of the EEC debate in Scotland, providing an opportunity for the expres-
sion of Scottish interests within it where little had existed previously. Thus, this 
relatively unimportant British foreign policy question became, in essence, a 
domestic political issue with national and international overtones that Scottish 
political elites and the public engaged on a fairly regular basis after 1967. One 
final question remains: what were the ramifications of the SNP’s negative EEC 
campaign for Scotland beyond 1975? 
In the short term, the Scottish result in the 1975 Referendum was an elec-
toral snub to the SNP. Despite garnering over 800,000 votes in the October 
1974 General Election, the SNP failed to mobilize fully its supporters for the 
No campaign. According to a report in the Economist after the vote, SNP sup-
porters had split sixty-forty against membership, which meant a significant 
amount of its voters failed to follow the party’s lead.101 In terms of electoral 
impact in the short term, the SNP suffered no immediate repercussions, main-
taining its polling support well into 1977.102 Policy-wise, the party quietly 
dropped its opposition to the EEC and began moving in a more pro-European 
direction, emphasizing a positive message about Scottish representation in 
Community institutions.103 This eventually resulted in the party’s adoption in 
1988 of its pro-European “Scotland in Europe” policy, which argued for Scot-
tish independence within the context of the EEC.104 However, the referendum 
result was a further demonstration that the party’s overall electoral support was 
unstable. Despite the SNP’s success in the 1974 elections, surveys had shown 
that a majority of the SNP’s voters did not approve of its stance on independ-
ence or even identify themselves as SNP voters.105 What this meant was that 
some SNP voters were protest voting against the two main political parties and 
were not solidly in support of the SNP per se; if and when other options came 
along, such as the Labour breakaway Social Democratic Party (SDP) after 
1979, they were capable of abandoning the party.106 Coming in the heady wake 
of the 1974 elections, the referendum result in some ways prefigured the SNP’s 
unstable and declining electoral fortunes leading up to its collapse in the 1979 
General Election. 
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In the long term, the impact of the SNP’s negative EEC campaign is less 
clear. On the one hand, the long national debate over EEC membership during 
the 1960s/early 1970s represented the beginning of a process of reintegrating a 
European dimension into Scottish society and identity. This had the potential, 
as the Labour MP John P. Mackintosh argued after the 1975 Referendum, to 
develop into “a European conscience [that would eventually] take the place of 
the British element in Scottish thinking.”107 Economic concerns partly drove 
this Europeanization. For example, groups like Europe in Scotland had at-
tempted to bring investment and economic growth to Scotland’s ailing eco-
nomic sector from 1971-1974. After 1973, Scottish elites exhibited a keen 
interest in the benefits the EEC’s regional development initiatives could bring 
to Scotland. Yet it was as much about mentality as anything else, and in this 
area the conclusions must be tentative. Europeanization in Scotland in the 
postwar era has been and still is an ongoing process that cannot be linked to 
one single event, and scholars have increasingly turned their attention to this.108 
What is rather clear is that prior to the 1960s, Scotland was more parochial in 
its outlook toward its European heritage, its horizons limited by its long-term 
adherence to British national identity and the British Empire after 1707. But 
after 1975, several years of probing debate about Scotland’s place in Europe 
and the concurrent rise in nationalism had increased Scottish awareness of and 
connections with Europe. Subsequent political developments, such as the pub-
licity surrounding the establishment of the Scottish Labour Party in 1976 and 
its push for Scottish independence in the EEC as well as participation in EEC 
institutions like the European Parliament, continued this long process of reinte-
gration by maintaining awareness of European issues.109 
On the other hand, the manner in which the early EEC debate took place in 
Scotland, with the SNP creating a linkage between nationalism and an anti-
EEC position, seems to have worked as a countervailing force against the goals 
of Scottish nationalism. That is to say, the SNP’s negative campaign actually 
inhibited Europeanization enough that it impacted the drive for Scottish inde-
pendence. According to recent research by Paolo Dardanelli, which compared 
the politics behind European integration and devolution during both the 1979 
and 1997 referenda in Scotland, attempts to “Europeanize” the self-government 
movement in Scotland failed in the 1970s, but succeeded in the 1990s, and this 
was a “key casual factor” in explaining the two outcomes.110 Although Darda-
nelli broadened his scope to explore several different Scottish elite actors, 
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certainly the role of the SNP in pushing resistance to the EEC between 1967 
and 1975 was vital in this failed Europeanization of the 1970s. And despite the 
SNP’s subsequent turn to Europe after 1988, the party still holds its fair share 
of die-hard anti-Europe campaigners just as anti-Europe attitudes in the UK 
have remained high as well.111 Thus the SNP’s experiences serve as evidence 
that regional attitudes and experiences have had wider implications beyond the 
specific details of the European integration issue. 
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